Actualidad Colombiana IN ENGLISH

The Grand 'Affair'

The kidnapping of Colombian Rodrigo Granda in Caracas is the regionalizing of preventive security and the first stumble of the South American Community of Nations.

JAIRO LIBREROS
Political analyst and Professor of Politics of Security and National Defense,
Universidad Externado de Colombia.

On December 13, 2004, an El Tiempo editorial announced with skepticism the birth of the South American Community of Nations (SACN). It noted that two factors could turn the dream of regional integration into ‘flag waving’: Brazil’s actions and the extraordinary list of infrastructure projects. The prediction turned out to be valid, but for a different reason.

The Re-election of Uribe in the Constitutional Court

“Until now the Constitutional Court has defended the Social and Democratic State of Right contained in the Political Charter of 1991. Let us hope that on this occasion it rules wisely for the good of Colombia”.

Ricardo de Lima
Essayist

Immediate re-election, that is to say, the constitutional right of the President of the Republic of Colombia to maintain power for a new term at the end of his first mandate was approved last December in the Congress of the Republic. The debate was intense, and so were the anomalies. A senator of the First Commission of the Senate of the Republic, Darío Martinez, pointed out that he had entered 17 faults in the eight debates that are required in Colombia for constitutional reform to be passed.

An Undemocratic Plan for Re-election

RICARDO DE LIMA
Essayist

On Tuesday 30 November, the House of Representatives of Colombia approved a constitutional reform allowing the immediate re-election of the President of the Republic, which includes the current chief executive, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who, in his electoral campaign of 2001 and 2002, always declared his opposition to immediate re-election. Nevertheless, and once in the Presidency of the Republic, he denies any cunning has occurred, but this legislative act has been denounced by members of the opposition in the Congress of the Republic throughout the past year. (1)

The original arguments were not very intelligent and actually reduce to one argument: President Uribe is doing well and requires more than four years to win the war against violence. For that reason, it would be best for President Uribe to continue governing as expressed by his Minister of the Interior, Sabas Pretelt de la Vega. The debate promoted by the opposition forced the instigators of the re-election to sharpen their arguments, which could be summarized in the following way: (i) in order to win the war, the policies of democratic security must be allowed to continue, and this can only happen if Uribe can extend his mandate by four more years, (ii) democratic political culture has advanced in Colombia, which means that the electoral campaign will be counterbalanced; the final decision will rest in the hands of the electorate, (iii) there is a system for checks and balances, and guarantees for the opposition, (iv) the control organisms will guarantee that the executive will not abuse his power. These summarize the arguments in favor of immediate re-election.

“I Do Not See a Contraparte that Accepts the Truth Commission"

Interview with senator and ex-militant of M-19, Antonio Navarro Wolf, on the question of President Uribe pardoning the demobilized M-19 and the alleged connection between M-19 and drug trafficking in the Palace of Justice seizure

"We cannot say that the crimes of the guerrilla are good and those of the paramilitaries are bad, which has been the tendency of our country. In the past, guerrilla atrocities were pardoned. M-19 burned the Palace of Justice in collaboration with drug trafficking, and were pardoned. Colombia cannot repeat these errors, either in favor of the paramilitaries or the guerrillas. An atrocious crime is an atrocious crime, be it committed by the paramilitary or the guerrilla. Now, if there is a peace process, we must look at the legal benefits as equal for all: whicht is what we are doing in these most difficult processes." Following this declaration made by President Alvaro Uribe Vélez during an October 1st meeting with Colombian citizens living in Miami, a large controversy was ignited, which is still going.

The independent bancada debated in the House of Representatives on October 27th. Participating were 80 demobilized members of M-19, current government representatives, some former civil employees of the Belisario Betancur government, which was in power when the event happened, and a member of the Special Court who had investigated the events at the palace. Representative Gustavo Petro reconstructed in detail the taking of the Palace of Justice on November 6-7, 1985, and later the key people of the event took part. Finally, the demobilized members of M-19 raised the issue of creating a truth commission. Nevertheless, the proposal is in limbo since Uribe's government has not responded and the media have not mentioned the subject.

Current Re-Election Reform: An Irregular Modification to the Rules of the Game

ALEJO VARGAS VELÁSQUEZ
“Official” Professor, National University

It is true that the debate surrounding re-election has been repeated in Colombian political history, but it is also true that Colombians have never really wanted to re-elect their presidents before.

In the 1910 constitutional reform, without a doubt a democratic reform for its time, that looked to file down the most authoritarian edges of the inherited political regime of the Regeneration, eliminated the immediate re-election of the President of the Republic and the presidential term of four years was established. Additionally, capital punishment was eliminated and a greater balance between public powers was attempted. During the period from 1910 to 1991, the only presidential re-election was that of Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, during what was called the 'liberal republic'. The post-National Front Carlos Lleras Restrepo and Alfonso López Michelsen tried, but failed. And General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was re-elected, but by irregular means, during the Golpe Militar period, through a Constituent Assembly of 'bolsillo'. The mechanism for not re-electing a president has been rooted in Colombia during the 20th century and occurred frequently; we need only remember General Tomás Cipriano of Mosquera.

The Liquidation of Inravisión: Another Step in the Monopolization of Mass Media in Colombia

CAMILO NARANJO

On October 28, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, through the National Council of Economic and Social Policy (CONPES), ordered by means of Decree 3550 the dissolution and liquidation of the National Institute of Radio and Television (Inravisión), citing its financial non-viability: pension liabilities that surpass 600 billion pesos. The directors of the Colombian Association of Workers of Television (Acotv) had not been notified officially of the liquidation, but they spoke out in a permanent assembly when they learned of the government's decision.

With Re-Election... More Democracy or Less

WILSON ALFONSO BORJA DIAZ
Congressional Representative for Bogotá

The re-election of President Uribe Vélez is defended by his followers as a way to extend democracy in the country. But, as 'democracy' is too generic a concept, we use a contemporary concept, coined by Norberto Bobbio in his book The Future of Democracy, to analyze such an affirmation: "Democracy is a form of government in which the right exists to participate directly or indirectly in decision making for a large number of citizens. Additionally, procedural rules allow such participation and decision making (such as the rule of the majority). Finally, conditions exist so that those called to decide or to choose who should decide, are considered real alternatives and are effective in choosing between one or the other".

More About Pensions

Uribe, obstinate in his intention, plans to revive the eighth point of the referendum: Law 860 of 2003, which would eliminate special regimes and not recognize international treaties such as 102 with the International Labor Organization, ending the transition phase and expectations for pensions

FENELL BURITICÁ PERALTA
Sintraseguridadsocial
Journalist

Ten years have passed since the Honorable Congress of the Republic, under the presidency of César Gaviria Trujillo, reformed the General System of Social Security and, hence, the pension system; and from that time the transformations have been great, through decreed regulations.

The sea of legal norms regulates Law 100 of 1993, which the country, especially the people who first saw it as an illusion and now as a meager economic reality, now deems as legally uncertain and insecure. Whenever it is time to fulfill the next requirement, the current administration takes its realization further out of reach.

EMCALI in Sight

Behind "Operation Dragon" are privatization policies

ASSOCIATION FOR INVESTIGATION AND SOCIAL ACTION
NOMADESC

These days, the high spheres of the Colombian government have had to be responsible for the existence of a parallel network of intelligence to which members, both active and retired, belong to the National Army, who with the support of the Executive and private companies designed a meticulous plan of pursuit against opposition political leaders, defenders of human rights and, particularly, against the workers of EMCALI E.I.C.E. E.S.P., the second most important provider of public services in the country.

The Watched Society:

FROM THE AUTHORITARIANISM OF THE EXECUTIVE TO THE AUTHORITARIANISMS OF DIVERSE POLITICAL COLORS

Commentaries on Re-election: The spell continues. The second year of the government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez . A report presented by the Colombian Platform on Human Rights, Democracy and Development

MARÍA EMMA WILLS OBREGÓN
Associate Professor, IEPRI UN

This brief review intends, firstly, to expose the thesis and central supporting arguments of the articles on policy included in the book Re-election: the spell continues. After that brief synthesis, I make some suggestions on how more accurately to capture the complexity of the Colombian situation – a military situation with several armed actors. Finally, these reflections offer some points that are rarely mentioned by those defending a negotiated solution to the Colombian armed conflict.