The Grand 'Affair'
JAIRO LIBREROS
Political analyst and Professor of Politics of Security and National Defense,
Universidad Externado de Colombia.
On December 13, 2004, an El Tiempo editorial announced with skepticism the birth of the South American Community of Nations (SACN). It noted that two factors could turn the dream of regional integration into ‘flag waving’: Brazil’s actions and the extraordinary list of infrastructure projects. The prediction turned out to be valid, but for a different reason.
That same day in a Caracas cafeteria, as he himself revealed later, Rodrigo Granda – an international spokesperson for FARC – was kidnapped by the Venezuelan National Guard, who were in charge of the detention, concealment and illegal transfer of the guerrilla from Cúcuta, in exchange for a reward. Here, the Colombian police took Granda.
Nevertheless, on December 15th General Jorge Daniel Castro, Director of the National Police, informed the Colombians that after precision work by the intelligence services, Granda was arrested in Cúcuta. Details of the police operation are not revealed in the official version, nor does there exist the customary video nor any mention of collaboration with the foreign authorities.
This clash of versions is the instigation of a local crisis that has suspended multinational trade, cooled diplomatic relations and threatens to throw overboard the South American union. The declarations of the parties have only stoked the fire. Who is in charge of the mishap? Colombia, for violating contiguous sovereignty; or Venezuela, a guerrilla sanctuary. What is the way out?
The isolation of preventive security
The United States' answer to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack is preventive security. Basically, the anti-terrorist strategy consists of utilizing all economic power, political influence and armed forces for pre-emptive action against all countries considered to be tyrannies, threatening U.S. security.
Cuba, Myanmar, Libya, Iran, North Korea, Belarus and Zimbabwe are "outposts of tyranny", which will get the brunt of preventive security if they fail to accept the parameters of war against terrorism; i.e. inspection of weapons of mass destruction, democracy and human rights' records, free trade and zero tolerance for terrorism.
Afghanistan, and at the moment Iraq, are the laboratories of preventive security. In Iraq, the United States has found a strong resistance to the elections scheduled for January 30th. But to resist the effects of terrorism, the Bush administration has a new ace under its sleeve: the Salvador Option.
The Salvador operation is a policy of special squadrons dedicated to capturing, kidnapping or eliminating terrorists and rebellious leaders in Iraq, and those hidden in neighboring countries. The name of this operation refers to the secret paramilitary actions made by the Reagan administration against the Salvadoran guerrillas in the 1980s.
Is it possible for preventive security to become on the American continent what it already is in Iraq? In South America three countries stand out in the eyes of the United States: Colombia, the main ally in the fight against terrorism; Venezuela, accused of being a negative force in the region – tyranny? –; and Brazil, leading the SACN in open opposition to the North Americans.
If we rely on the Venezuelan version, the Uribe government conducted a Salvador operation – kidnapping a terrorist abroad –, which not only violated the sovereignty of the neighboring country, but whose reward promoted corruption in the National Guard ranks. Additionally, Colombian police intelligence under-estimated the Venezuelan response, perhaps with the consent of the United States.
There is no other explanation. The passive implementation of the kidnapping is said to have delayed the surreptitious arrival of Granda to Cúcuta, using a great deal of money as a reward, and involving a series of inquiries that would not have been endorsed in any South American country, had it not been for the United States government being given the opportunity to demonstrate the connection between FARC and the Chávez government.
Ever since the peace negotiations between President Pastrana and FARC (1998-2002), the Colombian and U.S. governments have insinuated that Caracas maintains political contacts with this guerrilla organization, to such an extent that Chávez allegedly facilitates the Venezuelan territory as rearguard of FARC.
But the Colombian government's claim that Venezuela is a guerrilla sanctuary is very fragile. In Caracas on December 16, 2004, the Colombian Minister of Defense, Jorge Uribe, when answering a question related to the denunciations on the Venezuelan endorsement of FARC, said the following: "if we had assurance and proof from the outside then I would not be here".
Everything indicates that the words of the minister are true. On January 20th, Colombia gave Venezuela a list of guerrilla ringleaders, as well as possible locations of them, which seemed more a document of proof that Caracas offers protection to FARC. Even if some people have been identified, without video or testimonial evidence, this does not justify the actions.
Another argument being aired to substantiate the Chávez-FARC relationship is the Venezuelan documentation that lists the guerrillas that have been captured. In the Granda case, the documents are authentic, but were obtained through false means. It is possible to show that Chávez, in an electoral maneuver used while facing the 2004 referendum, eased requirements for acquiring Venezuelan nationality.
The Colombian guerrillas, drug traffickers and paramilitaries are certainly hiding in Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, etc. In some cases, these outlaws are protected by apparently legal residence or nationality documents. But does that mean those countries are sanctuaries for FARC? No, of course not.
Generalizing the application of preventive security will generate a state of isolation and distrust with the countries using it to obtain access to people fleeing justice. The war against terrorism progressing in the States has clear limits: the respect for national and international human rights.
The opening of South American security
The emergence of the multinational misfortune is diplomatic and regional. It involves the intervention of South American countries as facilitators of a negotiation scenario and of the re-establishment of mutual confidence. And in this space, Brazil is the strategic actor called to play a decisive role in the region, as visible head of the SACN.
South American integration, which revolves around democracy and economic development, must strengthen its priorities by pushing for a regional security policy. The crisis must be seen as an opportunity for creating a tool to solve differences, which manages to solidify political, diplomatic, and commercial relations in the region.
The government of Luiz Inácio 'Lula' Da Silva has demonstrated international leadership, autonomy and political distance in the face of the United States, which allows him to work for a foreign policy of regional security that integrates South American aspirations, without causing fear, isolation or distrust between the countries involved in the continental alliance.
With the lessons that will allow multinationalism, the discussion of a security policy must target central subjects like the definition of regional interest and the mechanisms for solving disagreements – as well as the establishment of regional orders of capture, the constitution for a regional system of intelligence, the creation of a regional police and the facilitation for the interchange of judicial evidence.
jla1@uexternado.edu.co
