Human Rights Are 'Clogged' Between London and Cartagena
Diego Pérez Guzmán
The meeting of the Board of International Coordination and Cooperation for Colombia is meeting in Cartagena February 3-4. The Board, which is better known as the Board of Donors, plans to continue with the process initiated in London on July 10, 2003. More than 24 governments will be represented, with delegates from the European Union, the European Commission, the United Nations System, the Andean Corporation of Promotion, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Colombian government.
The Cartagena results, moving backwards with respect to London
To begin with, we analyze the end: the results of the Cartagena summit.
President Uribe has promoted a reinterpretation of the Colombian conflict with the goal of accommodating and developing a model of society and State based on "democratic security", the implementation to which all Colombians must commit.
The discourse, ahistorically, is based on negating the existence of a social and armed conflict in the country and affirming that we are, exclusively, opposed to terrorism, delinquency and drug trafficking. The State is just another victim, like the rest of the citizens. The development of the nation and the well-being of the population require, primarily, strategies of security. The State needs to create a presence – militarily – all over the country and exert daily and social control over the entire population. The Political Constitution is abundant in rights, and demands very little from citizens in the way of duties and does not give the president the necessary powers to develop his initiatives. The human rights and international instruments of protection are the strait jackets that restrict national 'sovereignty'.
The substance of this discourse seems that it has been received in good stead by the international community and its governors, in particular the European Union.
It is true that the European Union, until now, has not had a political strategy nor one of sustainable and integrated cooperation for Colombia, yet agrees with the urgency and gravity of the situation. Its performance has been conditioned by the local political networks or pressures regarding negotiations between the Colombian government and the armed actors. Nevertheless, the endorsement of action taken by the United Nations High Commissioner’s Office in Colombia and the UN Special Envoy of the General Secretary for the management of peace in Colombia, as well as information and recommendations emanating from different branches of the UN towards the Colombian state, (ratified by participating governments in the London meeting) as well as the position of not supporting the military component of Plan Colombia, became a sure guarantee of International European Cooperation developing within the framework of clear rules of the game regarding the respect and fulfillment of international instruments protecting human rights, maintaining the State of Right and the extension of democracy.
Since the London meeting a rough draft of what will be the “Cartagena Declaration” shows a tendency of the European Union and participating governments in the summit for sharing the reinterpretation of the conflict in anti-terrorist terms: they share the substantive approach of President Uribe's proposals.
In the London declaration, the guiding principles (quasi-conditions) were: the fulfillment of the UN recommendations regarding human rights on the part of the Colombian government; the necessity for a negotiated political exit to the armed conflict and a state policy of peace; an agreement with the civil society and human rights organizations, as well as total guarantees for the development of its workings; the necessity to take effective measures against impunity; and the design of a coordinated and coherent strategy of cooperation, amongst others. In the Cartagena Declaration, government representatives will endorse President Uribe's policy of democratic security, his efforts to strengthen the fight against terrorism and illicit drugs; they will recognize and show support for the demobilization and reintegration process with the paramilitaries, recommending the importance of a legal frame for considering the principles of truth, justice and reparation; the government’s progress in fulfilling the recommendations will be highlighted and continued efforts will be encouraged; they will also encourage the government to reinforce existing measures of protection for social and union leaders, defenders of human rights, and spokespeople... and surely, will agree on the priorities for international cooperation under the six themes the Colombian government managed to impose during the process: forests, civil restoration, productive and alternative development, strengthening of the State of Right and human rights, regional programs for development and peace, and for the displaced and for humanitarian assistance.
The government representatives will record that civil society was heard and the Colombian government will change the paragraph because it believes that, not only has society been listened to, but that everything was agreed upon while engaging in dialogue with 'civil society'.
Thus the Cartagena meeting will leave many more questions than the London one and the government delegates do not want to deal with them and get into the many debates. Here are some of them:
- Do we know, in a serious and responsible way, what is really going on in this country? Do we really ‘buy it’ that rather than an ‘armed conflict’ we actually have ‘terrorism’ in Colombia?
- Can the process with the paramilitaries be recognized and validated as a process of negotiation and as a policy of peace? Is it possible to allow impunity to shelter crimes? Is it acceptable that during the 'cessation of hostilities', the paramilitaries committed 1,887 new crimes?
- Why have the United Nations and the international community been tolerant of the Colombian government’s flouting of important requests made by the European Union, the United Nations and international human rights organizations? Why is the government veto of the Special Adviser of Peace of the UN, James Lemoyne, acceptable? Why is it acceptable that the government changed substantial aspects of the Humanitarian Action Plan, such as: "humanitarian crisis replaced with humanitarian situation, armed conflict replaced by violence, victims of the conflict replaced by victims of the violence", which the United Nations system wrote?
- How can it be thought that the constitutional reforms of justice, taxes and pension actually strengthen the Social State of Right?
- How can the current measure of protection given to social and human rights leaders be seen as effective and as being enforced?
- Has the European Union seriously evaluated the outcomes of peace laboratories? Does the European Union realize what is happening with regard to the violations against human rights and the International Human Rights Law, of the implementation of 'mega-projects', the paramilitary occupation, and the communities and lands where peace laboratories are being developed?
- Is it acceptable that there is dialogue and agreement between the government and civil society after knowing of the corruption of the highest civil servants in government against the NGO of human rights, social organizations and political opposition?
We have heard it said, these days, that the Cartagena meeting, more than a board of donors, will be a place for political debate between international cooperation and the Colombian government. Based on the rough draft of the declaration being circulated, the so-called 'political debate' will be a gesture of flag waving.
The process between London and Cartagena
Despite the commitment made by the Colombian government in London, it still considers the "London declaration" a strait-jacket and prevents the development of its strategies and policies, and, therefore, eludes its commitments. Due to pressure by Colombian social organizations, the international cooperation agencies, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the Group of 24 countries (G24) that were in London, the government has accepted some places for discussion on its strategy of international cooperation, and to that end, the pursuit of the London declaration and the fulfillment of the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
With respect to the pursuit made in applying the UN recommendations on the matter of human rights, the process was signed by several attendees at meetings. The breach of most of the recommendations on the part of the government is clear: few tackled with limited progress on some of them, and persistence in policies and programs that clearly go against many of the recommendations.
The government has not taken any concrete actions to prevent human rights and international humanitarian rights violations, nor has it investigated, processed or sanctioned the people responsible. On the contrary, the government has continued promoting political directives, which involve more and more civilians in the conflict, and normative reforms that dismantle institutions playing a fundamental role in the protection of rights; it continues denying the armed conflict, the principle of distinction and even the humanitarian crisis.
The government sees the recommendations as an obstacle and not as a tool for strengthening state institutions, the Social State of Right and democracy. (This intention is clear in the document "Pursuing the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights", prepared by the Alliance of social and like-minded organizations for international cooperation for peace and democracy in Colombia and the Colombia-Europe Coordination, the United States, December 2004)
Other such meetings targeted high-priority action that constitute the Strategy of International Cooperation. Civil society organizations that participated in these meetings conclude that the cooperation strategy presented by the government does not respond to the spirit of the London declaration, that this strategy is more oriented towards the contents and postulates of the democratic security policy; the issue of peace totally disappears from the agenda.
On the other hand, the social organizations indicate that their consultation was limited and exclusive – not a real participatory process as was promised in the London declaration, in which civil society would work with the government on a cooperation strategy. The proposals and commentaries of the civil society organizations were not reflected in government documents.
In order to close this cycle, the participating civil society organizations in the process met on December 15th with members of the diplomatic body and President Uribe.
Civil society in Cartagena returns and plays
Without doubt, important civil society organizations were taking the London declaration seriously. As such, the "Alliance of social and like-minded organizations for international cooperation for peace and democracy in Colombia" was created following the London meeting. The Alliance is made up of more than 122 national and regional, social, environmental, union, human rights, peace, democracy, and development organizations. Since then, the Alliance has animated, impelled and coordinated discussions, elaborating on documents and participating with the government in public forums.
This Alliance, along with agencies of international cooperation and the national government, is calling on the international community to express its position, balance and proposals on February 2nd. The national government, resisting criticisms of the NGO and social organizations, is creating a scenario where civil society will also participate, in addition to the organizations of the Alliance and the international NGOs of Cooperation, the Union Council (Industrial), the Private Foundations (of the Unions); the National Planning Council and the Social Pastoral of the Colombian Episcopal Conference.
Only one person from each of the mentioned sectors will be allowed to participate on the third day of the meeting between the governments.
Clearly, once again, with the presence of some sectors of civil society in the meeting, the government will feel legitimized and gain from the endorsement for the process.
By way of conclusion
Everything seems to indicate that the Uribe government will not leave Cartagena with many dollars, but instead with good recognition of, and political support for, its strategies. The European Union will hold its ambiguous position as far as cooperation in Colombia goes, and the Colombian people will not gain any substantial improvements from this event, because it seems that between London and Cartagena, our rights are 'clogged' (lost) yet even more so than before.
